Authoritarian backlash on LGBTQ rights: a case of Russian anti-LGBTQ laws and the increase in the level of hate crime that they triggered

On 2nd August 2024 by Zoe James in Human Rights

By Sergei Katsuba, University College, Dublin, Ireland

In December 2023, the Russian Supreme Court labeled the “international LGBT movement” as extremist. This decision marked the culmination of a troubling 30-year journey from the decriminalization of homosexuality in 1993 to the enactment of the “gay propaganda law” in 2013 and finally to the “extremist” status in 2023. This progression in the mistreatment of LGBTQ individuals in Russia coincided with the increasingly autocratic nature of Putin’s regime. The recent ruling by the Supreme Court effectively reverts to a hybrid recriminalization of homosexuality, undoing the progress made over three decades. Now, identifying as queer in Russia can be construed as involvement in an “extremist organization,” constituting a criminal offense. Essentially, the situation has regressed to pre-1993 conditions.

Government policies that target LGBTQ people were introduced at Federal level in 2013 (the first iteration of the “gay propaganda law”), 2022 (its expansion), and 2023 (extremist status for LGBTQ community). As the records show, each time it resulted in adverse societal effects – the rise in the level of homophobic hate crimes. These government initiatives increased homophobia, prejudice and hostile attitudes that already existed in the Russian society. This provoked a chain reaction when hundreds of random people around the country (sometimes with the help of authorities) get involved in committing hate crimes against LGBTQ individuals. As we can see in our data – the spikes in homophobic violence followed the introduction of the government policies.

This blog article is an attempt to reflect on different stages in the mistreatment of LGBTQ people in Russia over the course of past 30 years – from decriminalization in 1993 to “extremist” status in 2023. 

Stage 1: decriminalization of homosexuality and the lack of meaningful change in the 1990s

Back in 1993, Boris Yeltsin’s government’s decriminalization of homosexuality seemed more like a perfunctory measure, a checkbox requirement for Council of Europe membership. The legislation that removed penalties for consensual sex between men was quietly passed without any public discussion, “as an omnibus package rushed before the Parliament” (Alexander, 2022). There was no public deliberation, no official rationale provided, nor was there any condemnation of previous practices and amnesty for those convicted in Soviet time. Consequently, in most regions of Russia, it failed to signal any significant societal shift in attitudes. This lack of dialogue allowed entrenched homophobia to persist and social stigma to endure.

Eventually, this resulted in the lack of a meaningful change. Even Russia’s prison officials were unaware of the reform, as there were no directives to release inmates and activists had to make phone calls and inform the prisons of the change. This stagnation led to a resurgence of prejudice, amplified by political discourse. Throughout the early 2000s, there was a concerning rise in negative portrayals and hate speech directed at the LGBTQ community, emanating from government officials.

During the 2000s, a series of legal measures aimed at LGBTQ individuals emerged, cloaked under the pretext of upholding morality with proposals to resurrect Stalin’s 1934 ban on homosexuality. While these bills failed to pass, they signalled a troubling shift as anti-gay rhetoric infiltrated governmental discourse, paving the way for more restrictive measures in subsequent years.

Stage 2: institutional discrimination

In June-July 2013, the so-called “gay propaganda law” was introduced. It established liability for the “promotion of non-traditional sexual relations among minors.” The definition of such “promotion” was ambiguous, granting wide discretion to law enforcement and judges. In reality it resulted in a blanket ban—according to the Russian Constitutional Court, expressions concerning sexuality are presumed dangerous by default, enabling law enforcement to restrict anything LGBTQ-related, since it can “entice minors in a homosexual lifestyle” (Bayev and others v Russia, 2017). Instances of “gay propaganda” range from wearing rainbow prints to screening LGBTQ movies. This legislation proved to be a turning point in the mistreatment of LGBTQ individuals.

The guise of protecting minors was merely superficial. The chairman of the constitutional court himself admitted that “the legal meaning of this prohibition is not so much about addressing the issue of promoting homosexuality among minors – but about emphasizing an understanding of the deviating nature of such behavior”(Zorkin predlozhil izmenit osnovopologayushiye documenty OON, 2014). In 2022, this facade was dropped as the ban expanded to encompass “gay propaganda” targeted at all citizens, not just minors.

The law, however problematic from legal point of view, worked as a symbolic message to the LGBTQ community. It was an assertion that this group are considered second-class citizens with restricted rights, insinuating that any injustices or violence perpetrated against them are somehow warranted. Eventually this resulted in the rise in homophobic violence.

Stage 3: the rise in anti-LGBTQ hate crimes in the aftermath of the “gay propaganda law”

The potential rise in homophobia as a result of this legislation was hypothesized by the European Court of Human Rights in 2017. In its decision decrying the law discriminatory, the Court stated that “by adopting such laws the authorities reinforce stigma and prejudice and encourage homophobia which is incompatible with the notions of equality, pluralism, and tolerance inherent in a democratic society” (Bayev and others v Russia, 2017). Despite the decision, the law was never repealed and was actively implemented. There was no attempt from the government to monitor the potential negative outcomes – hate crimes against LGBTQ people. Instead, there was erasure rhetoric – “We don’t have those kinds of people here. We don’t have any gays. You cannot kill those who do not exist” (Taylor, 2017).

The purpose of our research project (Katsuba, 2023a, 2023b; Kondakov, 2019, 2022) was to prove that statement wrong and elucidate that the introduction of the “gay propaganda law” resulted in a surge in hate crimes, setting off a troubling sequence of events. According to our research, between 2013 and 2018, hate crimes against LGBTQ people tripled from 46 in 2010 to 138 in 2015, marking a significant escalation from previous levels of violence. This trend persisted in subsequent years, with a sustained increase throughout the decade. Overall, I managed to identify over 1200 hate crime incidents in the period of 2010-2023. These incidents encompassed a range of atrocities, including violent assaults, murders, threats, property destruction, robberies, and more.

Stage 4: the rise of hate groups

The violence triggered by the introduction of government policies differs in type. After 2013 we observed a spike in cases of individual violence (which includes for example, random attacks on the street). Later on, however, we see the rise in premeditated crimes often perpetuated by groups of people. Over three consecutive years (2017, 2018, 2019), there was a surge in organized hate crimes targeting LGBTQ individuals, often orchestrated by homophobic hate groups. These perpetrators meticulously planned their attacks, deliberately selecting homosexual victims. Many of these hate groups utilized dating apps and websites as tools for “hunting” homosexuals. Videos capturing these assaults were frequently circulated online, increasing the negative effects for the community and making the crimes more impactful.

One particularly notorious hate group, Occupy Pedophilia, gained significant traction following the implementation of the “gay propaganda law.” Founded by Maxim Martsinkevich, also known as Tesak, the group operated across 40 regions of Russia at its peak. Tesak outlined the ideology of the group, asserting that homosexuality is incurable and advocating for its eradication. This kind of moral entrepreneurs became empowered and enabled by the previous stages of the homophobic developments in the country.

Stage 5: hybrid recriminalization of homosexuality

After the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, authorities took further steps to tighten control, expanding the reach of the “gay propaganda law” and introducing the “extremist” designation in 2023. In a landmark decision at the end of November 2023, the Russian Supreme Court branded the “international LGBT movement” as an extremist organization, effectively recriminalizing homosexuality, not based on sexual activities but on one’s identity itself. Merely openly identifying as queer now places individuals at risk of prosecution as part of an extremist entity. It can be speculated that these recent anti-gay measures serve as a concession to Putin’s conservative support base and a diversion from the conflict in Ukraine, particularly during its challenging phases in late 2022 and early 2023. LGBTQ groups have become convenient targets for the Kremlin.

The first instances of enforcement were seen in March 2024, three people were arrested, potentially facing a decade behind bars for their alleged involvement in an LGBT “extremist organization.” Vyacheslav Khasanov, the owner of a nightclub named Pose in Orenburg city, southwest Russia, and his two employees – club’s art director Alexander Klimov and administrator Diana Kamelyanova – accused of orchestrating participation in an extremist group. These individuals represent the first victims facing criminal prosecution for being LGBTQ since Soviet times.

Conclusion

            There is a concept in Jurisprudence of “evil law” (Lukina, 2022), which can be described by three characteristics: defective purpose (pertaining to the incentives of the legislators), intolerable harm (pertaining to the negative societal effects) and enabling (the link between the two). The “gay propaganda law” is a number one candidate for this status. We know about the defective purpose from the Chairman of the Constitutional Court (“to outline the deviating nature of such behavior”). We also know about the harm that this legislation does to people’s lives – we have records of the hate crimes that proliferated in the aftermath of this law. I argue that using “evil law” label is important to inform the meaningful change in the future. As we know, the absence of such change in the 1990s partially resulted in the introduction of homophobic policies. There must be a point when the current practices of the Russian regime are revised and condemned in order to move forward. As Russian LGBTQ historian Rustam Alexander puts it “writing LGBTQ history in Russia is an urgent enterprise which will have serious implications for the present and the future of Russia’s LGBTQ communities” (Alexander, 2022). 

List of references:

Alexander, R. (2023). Red Closet: The Hidden History of Gay Oppression in the USSR. Manchester University Press.

BAYEV AND OTHERS v. RUSSIA (2017). https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22fulltext%22:[%22bayev%22],%22documentcollectionid2%22:[%22GRANDCHAMBER%22,%22CHAMBER%22],%22itemid%22:[%22001-174422%22]}

Katsuba, S. (2023a). Premeditated, Organized and Impactful: Dating Violence as a Method of Committing Hate Crimes Against LGBTQ People in Russia. Journal of Family Violence. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10896-023-00638-z

Katsuba, S. (2023b). The Decade of Violence: A Comprehensive Analysis of Hate Crimes Against LGBTQ in Russia in the Era of the “Gay Propaganda Law” (2010–2020). Victims & Offenders, 0(0), 1–24. https://doi.org/10.1080/15564886.2023.2167142

Kondakov, A. (2019). The influence of the ‘gay-propaganda’ law on violence against LGBTIQ people in Russia: Evidence from criminal court rulings. European Journal of Criminology, 147737081988751. https://doi.org/10.1177/1477370819887511

Kondakov, A. S. (2022). Violent Affections: Queer sexuality, techniques of power, and law in Russia. In FRINGE.  UCL Press: London, UK. (2022). UCL Press. https://doi.org/10.14324/111.9781800082939

Taylor, A. (2017, July 15). Ramzan Kadyrov says there are no gay men in Chechnya—And if there are any, they should move to Canada. Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/07/15/ramzan-kadyrov-says-there-are-no-gay-men-in-chechnya-and-if-there-are-any-they-should-move-to-canada/

Zorkin predlozhil izmenit osnovopologayushiye documenty OON. (2014, September 30). https://www.fontanka.ru/2014/09/29/230/